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1Chapter 1. Revenge and Culture
Revenge behavior, or acts intended to directly or indirectly harm a party blamed 
for some prior wrongdoing (Aquino, Tripp & Bies, 2001; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; 
Allred, 1999), are ubiquitous.  Even the casual observer of the geo-political scene is
likely to acknowledge that the desire ‘to get even’ underlies many of humanity’s worst 
conflicts.  Although revenge within organizations is not as widely publicized, it is by no 
means uncommon.  The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
estimates that 1 million employees are assaulted on the job each year.  Albeit not all these 
acts are revengeful in nature, the desire for revenge has been found to elicit such 
counterproductive behaviors as employee theft (Terris & Jones, 1982; Greenberg, 1990), 
employee sabotage (Crino, 1994), antisocial behavior (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 
1998), workplace aggression (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998) and violence (Folger & Baron, 
1996).  
In recent years, the advancement of theoretical models of the revenge process has 
sky-rocketed (Allred, 1999; Bies, Tripp & Kramer, 1997; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; 
Glomb, Steel, & Arvey, 2002; Martinko & Zellars, 1998), and empirical evidence is also 
beginning to accumulate (Aquino, et al., 2001; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999).  The majority 
of these studies have followed Felstiner, Abel and Sarat’s (1980/81) dispute formation 
framework which begins with an employee’s perception of a harmful act, or ‘naming’, 
followed by employee’s assignment of responsibility for that harm, or ‘blaming’, and 
concludes with the revenge act aimed at the blamed party, or ‘claiming’ (See Figure 1).  
This line of investigation suggests that revenge behavior is more likely to be 
committed by an employee when there is a severe injury perceived by that employee 
2(Bradfield & Aquino, 1999), when a substantial amount of blame for the injury is 
assigned by that employee to another party (Allred, 1999; Aquino, et al., 2001; Bradfield 
& Aquino, 1999), and when a considerable level of the employee’s anger is directed at 
the blamed party (Allred, 1999). 
Notwithstanding the rapid progress in this area, an important limitation of the 
organizational revenge literature is that it has been focused almost exclusively on 
Western samples.  The study of cross-cultural differences in the revenge process is both 
theoretically and practically critical.  Although the occurrence of revengeful acts may be 
universal (Vidmar, 2001), the process of revenge, including its triggering events, 
consequent cognitions, and emotions may vary considerably across cultures.  We already 
know that cultures differ on a wide range of important phenomena ranging from micro-
level processes such as basic social cognition (Nisbett, Peng, Choi & Norenzayan, 2001) 
to more social interaction processes such as negotiation (Gelfand, Nishii, Holcombe, 
Dyer, Ohbuchi & Fukumo, 2001) and leadership (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & 
Gupta, 2004), and revenge should be no exception.  Examining cultural influences on the 
revenge process may allow for a more complete account of the reasons for revenge 
behavior, paving the way for revenge theories unbiased by cultural perspective.  Also, 
given the increasing globalization of commerce, travel, as well as conflict, culture’s 
consequences for revenge is of substantial practical importance.  Knowledge of cross-
cultural differences in the mediating process of revenge bolsters our ability to intervene 
in this cyclical and often destructive practice.
With notable exceptions (e.g. Hamilton & Sanders, 1992), there have been few 
studies examining the influence of culture on the revenge process.  Drawing on research 
3in law, sociology, and psychology, this thesis will explore such questions as: How does 
culture influence the perceived injuriousness of the triggering act (i.e. naming)? How 
does culture influence who and how much the injured party blames for the act (i.e. 
blaming)? And finally, how does culture influence the types of emotive pathways that 
lead to revenge acts (i.e. claiming)?  
To preface the following discussion, one of the major and unifying themes of this 
thesis is the influence of the victim’s construal of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Markus & Wurf, 1987).  I argue that construals of self govern every stage of the revenge 
process – from what is seen as a harmful act, to the ascription of blame, and finally to the 
emotions that spark  revenge intentions.  Moreover, self-construals have been shown to 
be profoundly shaped by culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and thus provide a 
powerful theoretical basis for understanding cross-cultural differences in the revenge 
process.  Specifically, the revenge model proposed will explore how independent versus 
collective self-construals influence the pathways leading to a retributive act (please see 
Figure 2).
In what follows, I will introduce the present-day, dominant paradigm of the 
retaliation process, and the relevant evidence.  Subsequently, I will offer a theory and 
hypotheses proposing cultural differences in the revenge process, describe the method 
used to test the hypotheses proposed, and conclude with a discussion of how this research 
contributes to the organizational revenge literature.
Naming, Blaming and Claiming
In 1980/1981, Felstiner, Abel and Sarat proposed a framework for dispute 
emergence and transformation.  As this perspective dominates the workplace revenge 
4literature and allows for the integration of research findings, it will be the guiding model 
for the following literature review, as well as for the proposed theoretical extensions. 
 The emergence and transformation of disputes framework proposed by Felstiner 
and colleagues consists of three sequential stages: naming, blaming and claiming.  In the 
naming stage, an employee perceives an injurious event, in essence ‘naming’ some harm.  
Once an injury is perceived, the blaming stage materializes. In this second stage of 
dispute transformation, the injured employee assigns responsibility for the injury to 
another party, or in other words, ‘blaming’ someone for the injury.  The third stage of 
claiming involves the injured employee seeking compensation from the blamed party.  
Thus, in this final stage of dispute transformation the injured party is literally ‘claiming’ 
what he perceives to be owed to him.
Felstiner, et al. (1980/1981) stress that the naming, blaming, claiming model 
(NBC) consists of stages that are “…subjective, unstable, reactive, complicated and 
incomplete” (p.631).  Although this model is a valuable heuristic for a variety of dispute 
processes, it must be supplemented by further conceptual development if specific 
predictions concerning revenge behavior are to be made.  
Moreover, Felstiner, et al. (1980/81) argue that the usefulness of this paradigm 
rests not in the stages themselves, but rather in the transformations among the stages, 
since it is these transformations that “…have consequences for the parties, [and for] their 
attributions of responsibility, [for] the scope of conflict, [for] the mechanism chosen, 
[for] the objectives sought, [for] the prevailing ideology, [for] reference groups, [for] 
representatives and officials, and [for] dispute institutions” (p.631).  As such, the focus of 
5this paper is on the factors within the revenge process that help transform one stage into 
another.
The Naming Transformation
The naming transformation focuses on the process by which a stimulus or an 
event is translated into a perceived harm by the employee.  Most theoretical models of the 
revenge process contend that the transformation into the naming stage consists of an 
event that is perceived to be a rule violation (Allred, 2000; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; 
Vidmar, 20012).  For example, Aquino, et al. (2001) argue that the revenge process 
ensues as a result of a perceived injustice citing the violations of justice rules (Folger & 
Baron, 1996; Greenberg & Alge, 1998; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  However, it is 
somewhat unclear why some rule violations set the revenge process in motion, while 
others do not.  A common explanation proposed in the above literature focuses on the 
severity of the rule violation as the variable that determines whether blame and revenge 
thoughts follow.  Indeed, Bradfield and Aquino (1999) found that as the severity of the 
perceived violation increases, the occurrence of revenge cognitions and behaviors is more 
likely. 
Although the severity of the violation can be a significant factor in the naming 
stage within the revenge process, it may not be the only one.  In his theory of emotion, 
Lazarus (1991) has suggested that events that threaten one’s ego identity evoke strong 
feelings aimed at reclamation of one’s self-concept.  Given that acts of revenge can be 
interpreted as a reclamation of one’s self-concept (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Vecchio, 
1995), a reasonable proposition is that threat or damage to the employee’s self-concept 
6can be a critical catalyst that is necessary for the emergence of a naming stage that is 
uniquely suited for the materialization of the revenge process. 
Given that culture shapes construals of self, the triggers of the naming stage (i.e., 
harm perceptions) are likely to vary across cultures.  Later, I will argue that differences in 
self-construals may cause cross-cultural differences in the perception of right and duty 
violations, leading to differences in the naming stage emergence across cultures. 
The Blaming Transformation
Following the naming transformation, the blaming transformation involves the 
assignment of blame for the perceived harm.  Borrowing heavily from attribution theory 
(Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995), the workplace 
revenge literature has assumed that the amount of internal control ascribed to the actor 
parallels the degree of blame imputed onto that actor (Allred, 1999; Bradfield & Aquino, 
1999; Martinko & Zellars, 1998). 
For example, Alicke (2000) suggests that the victim’s perceived level of internal 
control ascribed to the offending actor is determined by estimating the actor’s 
purposefulness to commit the behavior, and intention for or foreknowledge of the 
outcome resultant of that behavior.  Thus, for example, a person who shot and killed 
someone is assumed to have the greatest volitional control over that death, if this person 
(1) intentionally shot the gun aiming at the victim, and (2) wanted this action to kill the 
victim or knew that it would do so.  Such planned and informed behavior has been found 
to increase judgments of blameworthiness.  For example, Roberts and Golding (1991) 
found that when presented with vignettes depicting more or less planning of harmful 
behavior by a defendant, participants imputed more blame onto the defendants if they 
7planned their behavior more.  Similarly, in another study, Fincham and Emery (1988) 
showed that when individuals were asked to judge the blameworthiness of a child, they 
blamed the child less and assigned less punishment if the child had a psychological 
disorder.  However, this effect was only present when participants thought that the 
disorder would negatively impact the child’s capacity to control his or her behavior.
The role of the actor’s controllability in blame determination has generally gone 
undisputed in the organizational revenge literature (Aquino, Tripp & Bies, 2001; Allred, 
1999; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Martinko & Zellars, 1998), and much less empirical 
and theoretical attention has been paid to other possible determinants of blame 
attributions.  The social role of the alleged transgressor is one of such determinants.  
Consistent with Hamilton (1979) and Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy and Doherty 
(1994), I argue that two separate bases for blame ascription may exist.  Specifically, the 
actor can be blamed if (1) he or she is seen as having volitionally controlled his or her 
behavior and desired the negative outcome of that behavior as discussed before, and/or 
(2) he or she is seen as having the responsibility over the outcome by the virtue of his or 
her social role or status, irrespective of his or her foreknowledge of the outcome or actual 
action taken. 
 For instance, imagine an employee who perceives that others are spreading 
hurtful rumors about him.  This employee may blame his co-workers by focusing on the 
volitional control of his office mates, brooding about their planned assault on his 
reputation, believing that they intended or at least must have foreseen the emotional pain 
experienced by him as a result of their actions.  Conversely, this same employee may 
blame his supervisor who did not know of or participate in the rumor spreading.  In this 
8case the employee, may focus not on the supervisor’s volitional control in the situation, 
but concentrate on what the supervisor should have done and known as prescribed by his 
role as the person in charge, thus focusing on the social role occupied by the supervisor.  
Notably, as bases for the ascription of blame, the actor’s controllability and social role
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  However, they may provide distinct bases for the 
determination of blame.  Although several scholars have discussed both of these 
determinants of blame (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Hamilton 1979; Schlenker, et al., 
1994), there is a dearth of research on these factors as they apply to the blaming 
transformation within the revenge process. 
Furthermore, the impact of different determinants of blame on the blaming 
transformation may differ across cultures which cultivate distinct self-construals.  I will 
later argue that cross-cultural differences in construals of self (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991) may partially mediate the influence of culture on the blaming process.  
Specifically, the nature of the victim’s cultured self-construal may have a significant 
impact on his or her imputations of blame due to his or her differential weighting of the 
actor’s controllability versus social role determinants.  Thus, the content of the dominant 
self-construal may be of considerable relevance in the blaming transformation within the 
revenge process. 
The Claiming Transformation
The claiming transformation begins after the blamed party for a harmful act is 
identified.  The claiming transformation process refers to the manner in which the 
blaming cognitions translate into claiming actions.  The emotion nature of  the claiming 
transformation is addressed by this thesis. 
9Lazarus (1991) argues that the feeling of anger is likely when an individual’s ego-
identity is harmed, and the responsible actor is identified.  Likewise, the majority of 
revenge models argue that anger arises after a party is blamed for some harm (Allred, 
1999; Bies, et al., 1997; Glomb, et al., 1998).  Thus, there appears to be some consensus 
identifying the emotion of anger as the principal catalyst responsible for the 
transformation of blaming cognitions into claiming action.
However, the involvement of other emotions is possible.  Markus and Kitayama 
(1991) argue that individuals in Eastern cultures, which are more collectivist (Hofstede, 
1980) tend to exhibit more other-focused emotions such as shame as compared to ego-
focused emotions such as anger.  It is therefore possible that the type of the emotion 
experienced can also be influenced by the nature of the assaulted self-concept, suggesting 
that in Eastern cultures, shame will be the more likely emotion to spark revenge 
cognitions.  As such, cross-cultural variance in the emotional process preceding revenge 
cognitions will also be explored. 
In sum, although there has been some theoretical and empirical progress in the 
area of workplace revenge, the present-day organizational revenge frameworks have been 
developed and tested in the West and have yet to address cross-cultural variation in 
revenge processes.  As such, the extant organizational revenge paradigm risks limiting 
itself to the prediction and explanation of revenge acts committed within Western 
contexts.  It is important not only to identify differences in the cognitive and emotive 
pathways of the revenge process across cultures, but also to explain why these differences 
exist.  The focal purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the cultured construals of 
the self within naming, blaming, and claiming transformations of the revenge process. 
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Naming, Blaming and Claiming: The Role of Self-Construals
Through the examination of the revenge process from the self-construal paradigm, 
I hope to show how societal culture, through the influence of the independent versus 
collective self-construals, affects the pathways leading to (1) the perception of harm, (2) 
the blame for the harm, and (3) the behavioral response.  The general model outlining the 
proposed pathways and the relative difference in emphasis across independent and 
collective self-construals can be seen in Figure 2.
According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the distinction between independent 
versus collective self-construals relates to whether people see themselves as separate 
from others or as connected to others.  People who are socialized in Anglo-Saxon and 
European societies generally share a common moral imperative to develop a unique and 
separate identity, and assert that identity in a way that emphasizes one’s distinctive 
characteristics (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Seeing oneself as a completely independent 
entity requires the development, in the words of Geertz (1975), of a “…bounded, unique, 
more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of 
awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background” 
(p.48).  Thus, individuals with highly developed independent self-construals view 
themselves as detached from their social contexts and define themselves in terms of 
specific traits, abilities and accomplishments (Gelfand, et al., 2001).  Further, individuals 
in cultures where the dominant construal of self is independent share certain societal 
beliefs or focal concerns (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) that continually reinforce the view of 
an individual as a contextually-independent agent, endowed with certain rights that are 
11
not contingent on the situation, but are inalienable.  Information or actions that challenge 
these rights may undermine the very foundation of the independent self. 
By contrast, people who are socialized in Confucian, Latin American, African and 
Islamic societies share a common moral imperative to develop and maintain an identity 
marked by interconnectedness.  Experiencing interdependence as Markus & Kitayama 
(1991) argue, “…entails seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and 
recognizing that one’s behavior is determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent 
organized by what the actor perceives to be thoughts, feelings and actions of others in the 
relationship” (p. 227).  Due to the social context embeddedness of the collective self, 
social roles and obligations are highly salient for individuals with more dominant 
collective self-construals (Gelfand, et al., 2001).  Further, individuals in cultures where 
the dominant construal of self is collective share societally derived focal concerns (i.e., 
shared values and beliefs) (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) that reinforce the view of oneself as 
interdependent with the social context.  Thus, central to the collective self are the 
relationships between close others that define the individual.  Such self-defining 
relationships are characterized by duties owed to and from others, helping individuals 
maintain face in front of others.  In contrast to the contextually independent rights, duties 
are defined situationally and thus can vary across relationships.  Information or actions 
that challenge these relationally prescribed duty expectations are likely to be seen as 
violations of the collective self.1
1
 It is important to note that both independent and collective self-construals may be present within the 
individual (Markus & Wurf, 1987).  In a recent study, Hong, Ip, Chiu, Morris and Menon (2001) conducted 
a priming experiment demonstrating that both independent and collective self-construals can be activated 
within the same individual.  However, although both self-construals are available to most individuals, one 
of the self-construals is likely to be more cognitively accessible (Higgins, 1996), leading to its greater rate 
of activation upon contact with the environment (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000).  
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Self-Construal and Naming 
As discussed earlier, the naming stage is critical to the emergence of the revenge 
process. In other words, the harm perceived by the individual must be of sufficient 
intensity and type to spark the revenge process.  One of the types of harm sufficient for 
the materialization of the naming stage may involve damage to the victim’s self-concept.  
Of interest then is how culturally shaped construals of self influence the specific events 
which spark the revenge process. 
Individuals’ self-construals across cultures are shaped and reinforced by the 
culturally derived focal concerns.  According to Mesquita and Frijda (1992), concerns are 
called focal when “…they represent socially defined and shared concerns” (p.184).  
Moreover, these authors argue that the focal concerns guide the interpretation or coding 
of events in one’s environment. By extension, these societally shared concerns may be 
incorporated into individuals’ self-concepts, heightening intra-cultural similarity in the 
types of interpretations that can challenge individuals’ notions of self.  For instance, the 
shared focal concern for freedom irrespective of the social context is likely to be 
incorporated in the self-definitions of many Westerners and may be represented as a right 
to autonomy or self-expression.  An event that impairs these rights across situations may 
very well be an assault on the very definition of personhood in Western culture, where 
the independent self is dominant.  Conversely, a shared focal concern for maintenance of 
face as well as obligations owed varies in salience across cultural contexts and is 
represented in self-construals of many Easterners as a duty owed by or to a certain 
someone.  An event that violates this duty of face maintenance or obligation fulfillment 
in a given situation may challenge the concept of personhood in Eastern cultures. 
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Accordingly, I predict the following:
H1: Koreans will perceive the violation of a duty as more harmful than 
Americans, whereas Americans will perceive the violation of a right as more 
harmful than Koreans.
Moreover, I posit that it is not one’s country of origin, but construals of the self 
that will ultimately predict perceptions of harm.
H2: Cultural construals of self will interact with type of violation to predict 
perceptions of harm
H3: Cultural construals of the self will mediate the country by violation 
interaction on the person’s perception of harm. 
Self-Construal and Blaming
Cross-cultural research focusing on the blaming transformation is sparse.  With 
the notable exception of the sociologists Hamilton and Sanders’ (1992) comparison of 
Japan and United States, little work has been done on the subject.  Hamilton and Sanders 
(1992) demonstrated that when ascribing blame, the Japanese put less stress on the 
controllability dimension (i.e. what they called deeds) and more stress on the social role 
dimension than the Americans.  This line of research is highly applicable to the revenge 
process, as it moves away from focusing exclusively on the control of the actor in blame 
determination and examines how social roles can contribute to blame ascription.  The 
extension of Hamilton and Sander’s research into the domain of revenge is thus highly 
warranted.  Additionally, by accounting for the relative predominance of independent 
versus collective self-construals, cross-cultural differences in blame ascription can be 
further explicated. 
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As argued earlier, blame for injury in social interaction can be assigned on the 
basis of both controllability of the actor (i.e. degree of volition, intent) as well as the 
actor’s social role (i.e. degree of social role obligation).  For example, Schlenker, et al. 
(1994) argue that an actor’s job description may speak to his or her social role obligations 
in a given situation, while the actor’s level of intention refers to his or her level of control 
in a given situation.  Moreover, while both variables may be active in the determination 
of blameworthiness, the influence of these blame determinants on blame determination 
may vary across individuals with differentially dominant self-construals.  For instance, 
individuals in cultures where the independent self is more dominant occupy a social 
world where self-determination and volition are the bedrock of human interaction.  In 
these cultures, individuals are more attuned to volitional issues and thus may put more 
weight on the level of control exercised by the actor at the expense of a focus on the 
actor’s social role prior to the incident. Accordingly, I predict the following:
H4: In determining actor’s blame, Americans will be more influenced by the 
actor’s level of control than Koreans. 
H5: Cultural construals of self will interact with level of control to predict 
perceptions of blame. 
H6: Cultural construals of self will mediate the country by level of actor’s 
control interaction on actor’s blame. 
On the other hand, individuals in cultures where the collective self is dominant 
navigate in a social world infused with interconnectedness and obligations.  For these 
individuals, according to Gelfand et al. (2001) “…meeting social responsibilities and 
obligations in one’s social position is a moral imperative…” (p. 1061).  This greater focus 
15
on duty may also translate into a greater influence of the social role of the actor and a 
lesser impact of the actor’s control in the process of blame ascription.  Accordingly, I 
predict the following:
H7: In determining actor’s blame, Koreans will be more influenced by the 
actor’s social role obligation than Americans.
H8: Cultural construals of self will interact with social role to predict 
perceptions of blame.
H9: Cultural construals of self will mediate the country by level of actor’s 
social role obligation interaction on actor’s blame.
Self-Construal and Claiming
Behavior, the final step in the revenge process, begins to restore the victim’s 
threatened or damaged self-construal.  It is important to identify the process by which 
blaming cognitions transform into claiming intentions and actions.  Most revenge 
scholars have argued that the process that follows blame and precedes revenge action is 
of an emotional nature (Allred, 1999; Buss, 1967; Lazarus, 1991).  In particular, the 
emotion of anger is thought to motivate claiming behavior.  This paper assumes that the 
relationships between intensity of blame and intensity of anger and the consequent 
intensity of retaliation intention are likely to occur in all cultures.  However, there is also 
some evidence (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, Tinsley & Weldon, 
2002) to suggest that the emotion of shame may also play an important role in 
interpersonal relations within cultures where individuals’ collective self-construals are 
dominant.  Therefore, although anger is likely to predict revenge intentions in the U.S. 
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and Korea, feelings of shame may predict revenge intentions over and above feelings of 
anger for individuals from Korea.  Thus, I posit the following:
H10:  Feelings of anger will predict revenge intentions for Americans and 
Koreans.
H11:  Controlling for feelings of anger, feelings of shame will predict 
revenge intentions for Koreans more than for Americans.
H12: Cultural construals of self will interact with feelings of shame to 
predict revenge intentions. 
H13: Cultural construals of self will mediate the country by level of shame
interaction on revenge intentions. 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Self-Construals
Due to the central role of self-construals in this thesis, I am also interested in 
addressing some conceptual and measurement issues related to the self.  To date, the 
dominant approach in the literature has been to explore how the variance in independent 
versus collective content of the self influences psychological processes.  Largely missing 
from the literature is a discussion on the role of ambient normative pressures related to 
the independent and collective self.  The examination of the larger normative 
environment in prediction of cross-cultural differences is highly warranted since 
perceived normative pressures may play an important role in psychological processes.  
As noted by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), social constraints and affordances (i.e., norms) 
are important predictors of human functioning above and beyond individual attitudes.  
Moreover, normative pressures remain largely unaccounted for in the extant 
measurement of self-construals.  To date, the dominant measurement approach in the 
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self-construal literature has focused exclusively on individuals’ reports of their 
independent and collective selves.  Most notably, Singelis (1994) developed a scale 
which has been widely used.  Example items for the independent and collective scales are  
“I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects (I),” “My personal 
identity, independent of others, is very important to me (I),” “I will sacrifice my self-
interest for the benefit of the group I am in (C),” “It is important to me to respect 
decisions made by the group (C).”  Singelis’ self-construal scale, while useful for 
measuring independent and collective self-construal as an individual difference variable, 
does not directly reflect societal normative pressures related to the independent and 
collective self.  
In order to better explicate the potency of one’s normative environment, along 
with exploring Singelis’ measure and its predictive power in the revenge process, I also 
created a new version of the self-construal scale designed to investigate individuals’ 
perceptions of the dominant self-construal within a societal context.  In particular, the 
items paralleled those of the Singelis measure, but they incorporated a societal referent 
instead of an individual one.  A similar procedure was used by Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and 
Kaplan (2003).  For example, Koreans were asked how frequently, in their opinion, do 
most Koreans do the following: “Enjoy being unique and different from others in many 
respects (I), “Have a personal identity, independent of others (I),” “Sacrifice own self-
interest for the benefit of one’s group (C),” “Respect decisions made by the group (C).”  
The self-construal scale with the societal referent arguably reflects the dominant 
construal of self that has been cultivated in one’s cultural context.  Additionally, societal 
contexts infused with a particular type of self-construal result in a normative environment 
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that may substantially influence individual behavior.  Notably, the measurement of such 
felt normative pressures via the societal referent self-construal scales may also indirectly 
capture an individual’s ‘ought’ self (Higgins, 1987) as opposed to the ‘actual’ self 
measured by the extant self-construal literature.  This idea is further explored in the 
general discussion. 
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Chapter 2: Method
The central focus of this thesis is the effect of cultured self-construals on the 
influence of (1) right versus duty violations in perception of harm (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 
3), (2) controllability of the actor in determination of blame (Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6), and 
social role obligation of the actor in determination of blame (Hypotheses 7, 8 and 9).  
Also, this thesis investigates the differences in emotive pathways to revenge intentions 
(Hypotheses 10 - 13).  To investigate all hypotheses, two scenario studies were 
employed.  Scenario studies have been widely used to study human judgment processes 
in attribution (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992; Gonzales, Manning & Haugen, 1992; Walster, 
1966) and harm perception research (Gonzales, et al., 1992).  The utilization of the 
scenario methodology in the realm of revenge research allows for a controlled 
examination of variables deemed important in the revenge context. 
 The first study examined the influence of duty versus right violations and level of 
outcome severity in perceptions of harm.  The manipulation of outcome severity (i.e., 
severe vs. mild workplace consequences) is consistent with previous research 
investigating harm perceptions (Gonzales, et al., 1992).  Additionally, this manipulation 
allowed for the examination of how right and duty violations influence perceived harm in 
the context of severe versus mild workplace consequences.  The second study examined 
the impact of the offender’s control and role obligation information in determination of 
blame judgments, as well as the influence of anger and shame on intentions to retaliate. 
The scenarios were administered in the United States and South Korea allowing for 
comparisons of how individuals from different cultures evaluate harm, ascribe blame, and 
formulate revenge intentions.
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Both studies included measures of cultured self-construal with the individual and 
the societal referent.  The societal referent construal of self scales proved to have more 
predictive power. 
Study 1
Participants
Participants in Study 1 included 80 students from a mid- Atlantic U.S. university 
and 83 students from a university in Seoul, Korea.  The average age for participants was 
19.8 (U.S. average was 18.7, Korean average was 20.8.).  The overall gender composition 
was 66.3% female (in the U.S., the sample was 76.3% female; in Korea, the sample was 
56.6% female).  The participants’ reported full-time work experience averaged 1 year and 
2 months (9 months for U.S. participants and 19 months for Korean participants).  
Experimental Design
The study consisted of a 2x2x2 between subject design: 2 (Country: US vs. 
Korea) x 2 (Type of violation: Right vs. Duty) x 2 (Severity: High vs. Low).  
Additionally, participant self-construals were measured to test interactions regarding self-
construal moderation relevant to the Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Procedure
Participants were first asked to read the informed consent form.  After signing the 
informed consent form, the participants read a scenario describing an offensive episode in 
the workplace and responded to the scales that followed.  Before proceeding to the next 
part of the study, the participants were asked to complete a distractor task, which 
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consisted of putting 28 numbers in order and then answering questions about the task.  In 
the second part of the study, the participants answered a series of scales, including the 
original, individual referent Singelis (1994) self- construal scale and a parallel, societal 
referent self-construal scale.  Additionally, the order of the individual and societal 
referent items was counterbalanced in the study, with half of the participants receiving 
the individual referent items first and the other half of the participants receiving the 
societal referent items first.
Materials
Development of dimension manipulations.  The scenarios were piloted with a 
small sample of bi-cultural individuals fluent in English and Korean to ascertain whether 
the scenarios were sufficiently realistic in both cultures.  The translation procedures 
included initial translation by our Korean collaborators, then independent back-
translation by a party unaware of the nature of the study.  Finally, the original scenarios 
were compared with the back-translated version and discrepancies between the two 
versions were resolved through several discussions with both sets of translators.  All 
manipulations are shown in Appendix A. 
The following is an example of a right violation that has a severe consequence:
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month your agency 
was asked to come up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile 
phone company.  You and your co-workers were given two weeks to 
brainstorm ideas for the project.  You were told that at the end of the 
two weeks all of you would meet and present your suggestions.
After considerable effort, you came up with some unique and 
creative ideas for the advertising campaign. As the deadline 
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approached, you happened to share your ideas with a co-worker, with 
whom you work regularly. However, at the end of the two weeks, 
during your meeting, that co-worker spoke before you and presented 
your rightful ideas as his own without giving you any credit 
(Right Violation).
As a result, you were unprepared for the meeting and you did 
not get the promotion you would have otherwise (High Severity).
The following is an example of duty violation that has a mild consequence:
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month your agency 
was asked to come up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile 
phone company.  You and your co-workers were given two weeks to 
brainstorm ideas for the project.  You were told that at the end of the 
two weeks, all of you would meet and present your suggestions.
A co-worker, with whom you work regularly, owed you favor 
and promised to help. While you were going to brainstorm for ideas, he 
promised to do research on your client, the mobile phone company, 
which was vital to completing your recommendations.  As the deadline 
approached, your co-worker informed you that he didn’t do the 
research he owed you, and was not going to fulfill his obligation to you
(Duty Violation). 
However, due to your quick thinking, you had ideas to present 
and seemed prepared for the meeting (Low Severity).
Manipulation Checks.  Manipulation checks for the violation variable were 
employed.  Participants were asked to agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert scale to the 
following statements: “My rights were severely violated in this situation (for rights),” 
“The-coworker failed to fulfill a duty he had to me (for duties).” 
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Realism Check. The comparative cross-cultural realism of the scenarios presented 
was ascertained by asking participants to agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert scale to the 
following statement: “The situation described in the story is realistic.”
Perception of Harm. Perception of harm was measured via one question on a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = Not at all hurtful, 5 = Extremely hurtful): “How hurtful was your 
co-worker’s behavior to you?”
Individual Referent Self-Construal Measures. The independent and collective 
self-construal scales comprised of 15 items each (Singelis, 1994) (Appendix B).  The 
following are example items from the independent self-construal scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree): “I enjoy being unique and different from others in many 
respects,” “My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me,” “Being 
able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.”  The collective self-construal 
scale is exemplified by the following items (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree):  “I 
will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in,” “It is important to me 
to respect decisions made by the group,” “It is important for me to maintain harmony 
within my group.”  The independent self-construal scale was found to have a Cronbach 
of .75 for the American sample and .69 for the Korean sample.  The collective self-
construal scale was found to have a Cronbach  of .77 for both American and Korean 
samples.  
Also separate confirmatory factor analyses for both country samples were 
conducted using the parceling method in MPLUS.  Since individual items tend to exhibit 
low reliability and may violate multivariate normality assumptions, the parceling method 
was preferable to the use of individual items (Bandalos, 2002; Nesser & Wisenbaker, 
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2003).  Each of the 15-item measures was divided into 5 parcels of 3 items each. In the 
interest of maximizing sample size, for this analysis, participant responses from both 
studies were considered.  The data suggests a good fit for the U.S with a CFI of .95 (Chi-
Square/df = 1.66) and a modest fit for Korea with a CFI of .86 (Chi-Square/df = 2.9).  
Complete goodness of fit data along with the loadings of parcels are presented in Table 1. 
Societal Referent Self-Construal Measures.  The societal referent construal of self 
measure consisted of the items parallel in content to the individual referent scales.  
However, the items asked the participant what other people in their country would think, 
feel, and do (see Appendix C).  For instance, Korean participants were asked how 
frequently, in their opinion, do most Koreans “have a personal identity, independent of 
others” in the independent societal scale, and “sacrifice own self-interest for the benefit 
of one’s group” in the collective societal scale.  The societal referent independent self-
construal scale was found to have a Cronbach  of .81 for the American sample and .70 
for the Korean sample.  The societal referent collective self-construal scale was found to 
have a Cronbach  of .65 for the American sample and .71 for the Korean sample.  
As with individual referent scales, separate confirmatory factor analyses for both 
country samples were conducted using the parceling method in MPLUS with the societal 
referent scales.  Each of the 15-item measures was divided into 5 parcels of 3 items each.  
In the interest of maximizing sample size, for this analysis, participant responses from 
both studies were considered.  The data suggests a good fit for the U.S with a CFI of .91 
(Chi-Square/df = 2.21) and for Korea with a CFI of .90 (Chi-Square/df = 2.41).  
Complete goodness of fit data along with the loadings of parcels are presented in Table 2. 
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Analysis 
Hierarchical regression analyses were used to test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.  
Hypothesis 1, which stated that country will interact with the type of violation to predict 
perceptions of harm was tested by entering the main effects of country, type of violation, 
and severity in the first step and the interaction of country by severity, type of violation 
by severity, and country by type of violation, in the second step. In the third step, a three-
way interaction among country, severity, and violation was entered.  Hypothesis 2, which 
stated that the cultured self-construal will interact with the type of violation to predict 
perceptions of harm, was tested by entering the main effects of cultured self-construal 
and type of violation in the first step and the interaction of cultured self-construal and 
type of violation in the second step.  Hypothesis 3, which stated that the interaction of 
self-construal by type of violation will mediate the effect of the country by type of 
violation interaction, was tested in three steps.  In the first step, the main effect of 
country, type of violation, and self-construal were entered.  In the second step, the 
interaction of self-construal by type of violation was entered.  In the final step, the 
country by type of violation interaction was entered.  
The above procedures were conducted for each of the self-construal scales 
discussed: (a) independent self with an individual referent, (b) collective self with an 
individual referent, (c) independent self with a societal referent, and (d) collective self 
with a societal referent.  
Results: Descriptives
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations among all the Study 1 variables 
can be found in table 3. 
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Manipulation Checks.  First, the manipulation of the violation condition (i.e., right 
vs. duty) was checked by asking whether participants’ rights were violated.  It was 
expected that participants will perceive greater right violations in the right violation 
condition than the participants in the duty violation condition.  For the perceptions of a 
right violation, multiple regression analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
condition (Beta = -.56, t = -9.45; p < .001) and no condition by country interaction (Beta 
= .09, t = .342; p = .733).  That is, participants in the rights violation condition reported 
that their rights were violated more than the participants in the duty violation condition 
(Mright_cond = 4.37; Mduty_cond = 3.07).  As Figure 3 illustrates, both American and Korean 
participants experienced greater right violations in the right violation condition than the 
duty violation condition.
The manipulation of the violation condition was also checked by asking whether 
participants’ duties were violated.  It was expected that participants will perceive greater 
duty violations in the duty violation condition than the participants in the right violation 
condition.  Multiple regression analysis revealed no main effect of condition (Beta = .12, 
t = 1.62; p = .11) and a significant condition by country interaction (Beta = -.9, t = -2.9; p 
< .01).   Consistent with expectations, Americans in the duty violation condition 
perceived greater duty violations than Americans in the right violation condition 
(Mright_cond = 3.78; Mduty_cond = 4.30).   By contrast, Koreans perceived high duty 
violations in both duty and right violation conditions (Mright_cond = 4.71; Mduty_cond =4.57).  
As Figure 4 shows, Koreans construed both the right and duty violation conditions as 
violating duties.
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In sum, similar to Americans, Koreans perceived greater right violations in the 
right violation condition versus the duty violation condition.  However, in contrast to 
Americans, Koreans perceived violations of duty to be equal across both right and duty 
violation conditions.  Interestingly, this result is paralleled in Gelfand’s et al. (2001) 
research, where the authors found that the same events can be construed as right violating 
by Americans, but duty violating by Japanese. This cultural difference has implications 
for the interpretation of the results to be presented and will be discussed in greater length 
in the discussion section.  
Realism Check.  The realism of the scenarios presented was checked by asking 
whether the situation in the story presented was realistic.  Multiple regression analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of country (beta = .05, t = .58; p = .56) (MUSA = 4.54; 
MKOREA = 4.60), violation condition (beta = -.09, t = -1.14; p = .25) (Mright = 4.62; Mduty = 
4.51), or severity condition (beta = .05, t = .62; p = .54) (Mlow = 4.54; Mhigh = 4.59).  
Also, no significant interactions were found. 
Self-Construal Scales.  When measured on an individual referent self-construal 
scale, Americans did not score significantly higher on the independent self-construal than 
Koreans (Beta = .11, t = -1.46; p = .15) (MUSA = 4.82; MKOREA = 4.67).  Moreover, 
Koreans did not score significantly higher on the individual referent collective self-
construal than Americans (Beta = .05, t = .65; p = .52) (MUSA = 4.81; MKOREA = 4.87). 
By contrast, results of the newly constructed societal referent self-construal scales 
were substantially different from the individual referent scales.  Americans scored 
significantly higher on the societal referent independent self-construal than Koreans (Beta 
= -.25, t = -3.31; p < .001) (MUSA = 3.20; MKOREA = 2.95).  Also, Koreans scored 
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significantly higher on the societal referent collective self-construal than Americans (Beta 
= .64, t = 10.4; p < .001) (MUSA = 3.13; MKOREA = 3.79).
Results: Hypothesis Testing
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Koreans experienced more harm than Americans in 
the duty violation condition. Table 4 demonstrates that there was a significant interaction 
between country and violation condition on perceived harm (Beta = .73, p < .05).  At the 
same time, Koreans and Americans experienced an equal amount of harm in the right 
violation condition, which is consistent with the finding that Koreans perceive high duty 
violations in the right violation condition.  In support of hypothesis 1, Figure 5 
demonstrates that Koreans perceived more harm in the duty violation condition than 
Americans and an equal amount of harm in the right violation condition.  With regard to 
the severity manipulation, as Table 4 demonstrates, there was no main effect of or 
interaction with the outcome severity condition.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Table 4 demonstrates that there was a significant 
interaction between societal referent collective construal of self and violation condition 
on perceived harm (Beta = 1.17, p < .05), which parallels the country effect just 
described.  Figure 6 illustrates that individuals with high societal referent collective 
selves experience more harm in the duty violation condition and similar harm in the right 
violation condition when compared to individuals with low societal referent collective 
selves. 
In support of Hypothesis 3, Table 4 demonstrates that when societal referent 
collective self-construal by violation condition is controlled, the country by violation 
condition interaction is no longer significant (Beta = .45, p = .28).  Furthermore, Sobel 
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test analyses (Sobel, 1982) indicate a significant mediation of the societal referent 
collective self-construal (t = 2.11, p < .05).  Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Notably, neither the individual referent independent self scale (Beta = -.82, p = 
.16), nor the individual referent collective self scale (Beta = .72, p = .25) interacted with 
type of violation to predict perceptions of harm.  Additionally, the societal referent 
independent self scale did not interact with type of violation to predict perceptions of 
harm (Beta = -.54, p = .31).
Study 1 Discussion
As predicted, the results indicate that the breaking of a duty (i.e., promise) 
constitutes a graver act for individuals socialized in Korea than the United States.  
Furthermore, the duty violation was particularly salient for individuals with high societal 
referent collective construals of self.  Finally, when the societal referent collective 
construal of self was controlled, the country difference in harm perceptions after duty 
violations reduced considerably.  The latter finding suggests a mediating role of self-
construal in the naming process.
Contrary to the prediction, however, the breaking of a right did not result in 
greater harm for Americans than for Koreans.  Notable, however, is the finding that 
Koreans were more likely to view the violation in the right condition as also indicative of 
a broken promise or a duty as compared to Americans.  It is relatively clear that in the 
experimental right condition, an individual may either focus on the loss of stolen 
intellectual property (i.e. violation of a right) or on the breach of a duty owed by the co-
worker (i.e., violation of a duty).  This is consistent with Gelfand, et al.’s (2001) 
multidimensional scaling study where given the same set of conflict descriptions, 
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Americans were more likely to construe the conflicts as violations of rights, while the 
Japanese were more likely to interpret them as violations of duty.  Moreover, 
manipulation check analyses make it clear that while Americans perceived duty 
violations mostly in the duty violation condition, Koreans perceived duty violations in 
both right and duty violation conditions, suggesting that Koreans’ high perceptions of 
harm in the right violation condition are a result of a perceived duty breach, whereas 
Americans’ high perceptions of harm in the right condition are a result of a perceived 
individual right infringement.  Given the utmost importance of duties and obligations in 
the Korean cultural context, it is perhaps of no surprise that Koreans applied a duty-
focused cognitive “hammer” across both situations. 
Interestingly, exploratory analyses with the outcomes severity manipulation 
yielded no relevant main effects or interactions.  It is suspected that the right and duty 
violations were more psychologically salient to participants than the severity of 
workplace outcomes presented. 
Another purpose of this study was to examine the moderating influence of 
individual referent and societal referent self-construal scales.  Results indicate that there 
were no cross-cultural differences on individual referent independent and collective self 
scales.  However, the societal referent independent and collective self scales did show 
significant differences across cultures in the expected direction.  Furthermore, only the 
societal referent scales, and in particular, the collective self scale, explained country by 
condition interaction.  As discussed previously, societal referent scales may be better able 
to capture the present-day, normative pressures experienced by the respondents that are 
not captured by self-construal scales aimed solely at individual beliefs.  It may be the 
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case that it is not one’s ‘actual’ self-construal that is determinative of reactions to 
violations, but rather it is one’s ‘ought’ self-construal, shaped by the people that 
surround, that is more predictive of differences in harm perceptions across cultures. 
Thus, Study 1 provides some evidence of cross-cultural differences in the naming 
process, as well as demonstrates the mediating role of societal referent collective self-
construal in the naming stage.  In the next study, I examined cross-cultural differences in
ascribing blame and formulating revenge intentions.  I also investigated whether self-
construal mediates these cross-cultural differences.
Study 2
Participants
Participants in Study 2 included 117 students from a mid-Atlantic U.S. university
and 122 students from a university in Seoul, Korea.  The overall average age for 
participants was 19.7 (U.S. average was 19.1; Korean average was 20.3).  The overall 
gender composition was 63.6% female (in the U.S., the sample was 64.1% female; in 
Korea, the sample was 63.1% female).  The participants’ reported full-time work 
experience averaged to 1 year and 4 months (16 months for U.S. participants and 15 
months for Korean participants).  
Experimental Design
The study consisted of a 3x2x2 between subject design: 2 (level of control:  high 
vs. low vs. none), 2 (level of role: high vs. low), 2 (country: US vs. Korea).  In this study, 
outcome severity was held constant across all manipulations.  Additionally, participant 
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individual and societal referent self-construals were measured to test interactions 
regarding self-construal moderation. 
Procedure
Participants were first asked to read the informed consent form.  After signing the 
informed consent form, the participants read a scenario describing an offensive episode in 
the workplace and responded to the scales that followed.  Before proceeding to the next 
part of the study, the participants were asked to complete a distractor task, which 
consisted of putting 28 numbers in order and then answering questions about the task.  In 
the second part of the study, the participants answered a series of scales, including the 
original, individual referent Singelis (1994) self-construal scale, and a parallel, societal 
referent self-construal scale.  Additionally, the order of the individual and societal 
referent items was counterbalanced in the study, with half of the participants receiving 
the individual referent items first and the other half of the participants receiving the 
societal referent items first.
Materials
Development of dimension manipulations.  As with Study 1, the scenarios were 
piloted with a small sample of bi-cultural individuals fluent in English and Korean to 
ascertain whether the scenarios were sufficiently realistic in both cultures.  The level of 
control manipulation mirrored the three control states typically used in the attribution 
literature (cf. Gonzales, et al., 1992): Intentional, Negligent, and Accident.  The role 
manipulation was designed to vary the level of the a priori responsibility of the co-
worker.  In particular, the co-worker either had a high role due to the possession of 
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position-mandated duties or lack of them.  The translation procedures followed for Study 
2 were the same as in Study 1.  All manipulations can be seen in Appendix D. 
The following is an example of a low role, high control scenario:
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month you were 
asked to come up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile phone 
company.  Your agency was very interested in attracting more business 
from this mobile phone company in the future.
A co-worker, with whom you work with regularly, was going 
to deliver your project by 5 p.m. that day, the deadline for the job.  You 
asked the co-worker to deliver your project over to the phone company 
by that deadline although delivering documents was not part of his job 
duties (Low Role).
Unfortunately, later in the day he decided that the delivery of 
your project was not a priority.  As a result, he intentionally turned in 
your project after the 5 p.m. deadline (High Control).
Due to the lateness of the project the mobile phone company 
could not consider your advertising campaign and did not buy it.
The following is an example of a high role, no control/accident scenario: 
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month you were 
asked to come up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile phone 
company.  Your agency was very interested in attracting more business 
from this mobile phone company in the future.
A co-worker, with whom you work with regularly, was going 
to deliver your project by 5 p.m. that day, the deadline for the job.  You 
asked the co-worker to deliver your project over to the phone company 
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by that deadline since he was in charge of office mail and delivering 
documents was part of his job duties (High Role).
Unfortunately, on the way to delivery, he got into a car 
accident that was completely not his fault.  As a result, he turned in 
your project after the 5 p.m. deadline (No Control).
Due to the lateness of the project the mobile phone company 
could not consider your advertising campaign and did not buy it.
Finally, the following scenario had a low control condition that was in between 
high and no control conditions: 
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month you were asked to come 
up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile phone company.  Your agency 
was very interested in attracting more business from this mobile phone company 
in the future.
A co-worker, with whom you work with regularly, was going to deliver your 
project by 5 p.m. that day, the deadline for the job.  You asked the co-worker to deliver 
your project over to the phone company by that deadline since he was in charge of office 
mail and delivering documents was part of his job duties (High Role).
Unfortunately, he forgot about the delivery. As a result, he unintentionally 
turned in your project after the 5 p.m. deadline (Low Control). 
Due to the lateness of the project the mobile phone company could not consider 
your advertising campaign and did not buy it.
Manipulation Checks.  Manipulation checks for the control and role variables 
were employed.  Perceived control level was measured via a 3-item scale that asked 
participants to agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert scale to the following statements: “It 
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was possible for the co-worker to have behaved differently,” “The co-worker had a lot of 
control over what happened in the situation,” and “The co-worker could not have 
prevented what happened in the situation (R).”  The control manipulation check scale 
demonstrated Cronbach  of .87 and .78 in American and Korean samples, respectively.  
The role level manipulation check consisted of the following three items: “The co-worker 
had a strong obligation to act differently,” “The co-worker had a big responsibility to 
prevent what happened in this situation,” and “The co-worker had an obligation to 
prevent what happened in this situation.”  The role level manipulation scale demonstrated 
Cronbach  of .88 and .82 in American and Korean samples, respectively. 
Realism Check. The comparative cross-cultural realism of the scenarios presented 
was ascertained by asking participants to agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert scale to the 
following statement: “The situation described in the story is realistic.”
Blame of Actor. Blame ascribed to the actor was operationalized by a 6-item 
measure (see Appendix E).  Participants were asked if they agree (1 = strongly disagree, 
5 = strongly agree) with the statements on a 5-point Likert scale.  The following are 
representative items from the scale: “I blame the co-worker,” “The co-worker is guilty,” 
and “The co-worker wronged me.” The scale was adapted from Wade’s (1989) 
victimization scale and has been used repeatedly in workplace revenge research 
(Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Bies, Tripp and Kramer, 2001).  The blame scale was found 
to have a Cronbach  of .84 in the American sample and .90 in the Korean sample.
Anger.  Anger at the co-worker was measured via a 5-item scale (Appendix F). 
On 5-point Likert scale, participants were asked the extent to which they would feel a 
certain way.  The following are representative items (1 = very unlikely,  5 = very likely):  
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“I would feel angry at the co-worker,” “I would feel hostility towards the co-worker,” and 
“I would be furious at the co-worker.”  The scale’s Cronbach  was .92 for both the 
American and Korean samples.
Shame. The feeling of shame felt was measured via a 7-item scale (Appendix G) 
that was adopted from Harder and Zalma’s (1990) Personal Feelings Questionnaire-
2(PFQ2) shame measure. On a 5-point Likert scale, participants were asked the extent to 
which they would feel a certain way.  The following are representative items (1 = very 
unlikely, 5 = very likely):  “I would feel humiliated in this situation,” “I would feel 
embarrassed in this situation,” and “I would feel self-conscious in this situation.”  The 
scale’s Cronbach  was .71 in the American sample and .85 in the Korean sample.
Revenge Intentions. Revenge intentions were measured via a 5-item scale 
(Appendix H) that was adopted from Wade’s (1989) victimization scale.  The following 
are sample items (1 = very unlikely, 5 = very likely): “I would get even,” “I would make 
him pay,” and “I would want to see him hurt and miserable.”  The scale’s Cronbach 
was .90 in the American sample and .94 in the Korean sample.
Self-Construal Measures. The independent and collective self-construal scales at 
the individual referent were identical to those of Study 1.  The individual referent 
independent self-construal scale was found to have Cronbach s of .76 for the American 
sample and .72 for the Korean sample.  The individual referent collective self-construal 
scale was found to have Cronbach s of .72 for the American and .69 for the Korean 
sample.  As in Study 1, the societal referent construal of self measure consisted of the 
items parallel in content to the individual referent scales.  The societal referent 
independent self-construal scale was found to have Cronbach s of .76 for the American 
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sample and .75 for the Korean sample.  The societal referent collective self-construal 
scale was found to have Cronbach s of .73 for the American sample and .75 for the 
Korean sample. 
Analysis 
Hierarchical regression analyses were used to test blame, emotion, and revenge 
intention hypotheses. 
Blame Hypotheses.  Hypotheses 4 and 7, which stated that country will interact 
with role level as well as control level to predict ascriptions of blame were tested by 
entering the main effects of country, role level, and control level in the first step and the 
interactions of country by control level, country by role level, and control by role in the 
second step. In the third step, a three-way interaction of country, control, and role level 
was entered.  Hypothesis 5, which stated that the cultured self-construal will interact with 
level of control to predict ascriptions of blame, was tested by entering the main effects of 
cultured self-construal and level of control in the first step and the interaction of cultured 
self-construal by level of control in the second step.  Hypothesis 8, which stated that the 
cultured self-construal will interact with level of role to predict ascriptions of blame, was 
tested by entering the main effects of cultured self-construal and level of role in the first 
step and the interaction of cultured self-construal by level of role in the second step.   
Hypothesis 6, which stated that the interaction of cultured self-construal by level of 
control will mediate the effect of the country by level of control interaction, was tested in 
three steps.  In the first step, the main effects of country, level of control, and self-
construal were entered. In the second step, the interaction of self-construal by level of 
control was entered.  In the final step, the country by level of control interaction was 
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entered.  Hypothesis 9, which stated that the interaction of cultured self-construal by level 
of role will mediate the effect of the country by level of role interaction, was tested in 
three steps.  In the first step, the main effects of country, level of role, and self-construal 
were entered.  In the second step, the interaction of self-construal by level of role was 
entered.  In the final step, the country by level of role interaction was entered. 
All analyses involving self construals were performed four times for each of the 
self-construal scales discussed: (a) independent self with the individual referent, (b) 
collective self with the individual referent, (c) independent self with the societal referent, 
and (d) collective self with the societal referent.  
Revenge Intentions Hypotheses. Hypothesis 10, which stated that anger would 
predict revenge intentions in both the U.S. and Korea, was tested by looking at whether 
there was a main effect of anger and anger by country interaction.  Hypothesis 11, which 
stated that controlling for anger, country will interact with shame level to predict revenge 
intentions was tested by entering the main effects of country, anger level, and shame level 
in the first step, and the interactions of country by anger level and country by shame level 
in the second step.   Hypothesis 12, which stated that the cultured self- construal will 
interact with the level of shame to predict revenge intentions, was tested by entering the 
main effects of cultured self-construal and shame level in the first step and the interaction 
of cultured self-construal by shame level in the second step.  Hypothesis 13, which stated 
that the interaction of cultured self-construal by shame level will mediate the effect of the 
country by shame level interaction, was tested in three steps.  In the first step, the main 
effects of country, anger, shame, and self-construal were entered.  In the second step, the 
interaction of self-construal by shame level was entered.  In the final step, the country by 
39
anger level and the country by shame level interactions were entered.  I examined the 
hypothesis that the country by shame level interaction will not explain additional variance 
when self-construal by shame level is controlled.  
All analyses involving self construals were performed four times for each of the 
self-construal scales discussed: (a) independent self with the individual referent, (b) 
collective self with the individual referent, (c) independent self with the societal referent, 
and (d) collective self with the societal referent.  
Results: Descriptives
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations among all the study variables 
can be found in Table 5.
Manipulation Checks.  First, the manipulation of the control condition (i.e., high 
vs. low vs. none) was checked via a 3-item perceived control scale.  It was expected that 
participants will perceive the greatest control in the high control condition and the lowest 
in the no control condition.  Multiple regression analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of the control condition (beta = -.67, t = -13.77; p < .001).  More participants 
agreed that the actor had control in the high control condition than in the low control and 
no control conditions (MhighC = 4.24; MlowC = 3.98; MnoC = 2.48), and there was no 
condition by country interaction (beta = .30, t = 1.54; p = .13).  
The manipulation of the role condition (i.e., high vs. low) was checked via a 3-
item perceived role scale.  It was expected that participants would perceive the actor to 
have a higher role in the high role than in the low role condition.  Multiple regression 
analysis revealed no significant main effect of the role condition (beta = -.11, t  = -1.68; p 
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= .10) (MhighR= 3.62 ; MlowR = 3.40) and no significant role condition by country 
interaction.  This suggests that the role manipulation was not salient to the participants. 
Realism Check.  The realism of the scenarios presented was checked by asking 
whether the situation in the story presented was realistic.  Multiple regression analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of country (beta = .08, t = 1.19; p = .24) (MUSA = 4.41; 
MKOREA = 4.46), control condition (beta = -.07, t = -1.04; p = .30) (MhighC = 4.47; MlowC = 
4.59; MnoC = 4.34), or role condition (beta = .09, t = 1.32; p = .19) (MhighR= 4.4; MlowR = 
4.53).  Also, no significant interactions were found. 
Self-Construal Scales.   Americans scored significantly higher on the individual 
referent independent self-construal than Koreans (beta = -.20, t = -3.1; p < .01) (MUSA = 
4.91; MKOREA = 4.65).  Moreover, Americans scored significantly higher on the 
individual referent collective self-construal than Koreans (beta = -.17, t = -2.68; p < .01) 
(MUSA = 4.84; MKOREA = 4.63).  
As in Study 1, results of the societal referent self-construal scales were different 
from the individual referent scales.  As would be expected, Americans scored 
significantly higher on the societal referent independent self-construal than Koreans (beta 
= -.31, t = -4.9; p < .001) (MUSA = 3.19; MKOREA = 2.89).  Also, Koreans scored 
significantly higher on the societal referent collective self-construal than Americans (beta 
= .66, t = 13.49; p < .001) (MUSA = 3.03; MKOREA = 3.80).
Results: Hypothesis Testing
Blame Hypotheses.  Table 6 demonstrates that there was a significant interaction 
of country and the control condition on ascribed blame (Beta = .43, p < .05).  Figure 7 
illustrates the nature of this interaction.  In support of Hypothesis 4, Americans appeared 
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to be more sensitive to the actor’s level of control when ascribing blame than Koreans.  
In particular, in the no control or accident condition, Koreans ascribed substantially more 
blame than Americans. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, Table 6 demonstrates that there was a significant 
interaction of collective construal of self with the societal referent and control condition 
on ascribed blame (Beta = .66, p < .05).  Figure 8 illustrates the nature of interaction.  It 
appears that high collective self individuals are less sensitive to actor’s control when 
ascribing blame than low collective self individuals.  Similar to the country by control 
interaction on blame, the disparity in blame ascriptions between high collective and low 
collective self individuals is especially high in the no control/accident condition. 
In support of Hypothesis 6, Table 6 demonstrates that when the self-construal 
(societal referent) by control condition interaction is controlled, the country by control 
condition interaction is no longer significant (Beta = .21, p = .43).  Furthermore, Sobel 
test analyses indicate a significant mediation of the societal referent collective self-
construal (t = 2.10, p < .05).  Thus, Hypothesis 6 is supported.
Notably, neither the individual referent independent self scale (Beta = -.21, p = 
.60), nor the individual referent collective self scale (Beta = .10, p = .82) interacted with 
control to predict ascriptions of blame.  Additionally, the societal referent independent 
self scale did not interact with control to predict ascriptions of blame (Beta = -.19, p = 
.58).  
However, hypotheses involving the role manipulation were not supported.  As 
Table 6 demonstrates, there was no significant interaction of country and the role 
condition on ascribed blame (Beta = -.12, p = .58).  Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not 
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supported.  Also, Hypothesis 8 was not supported as there was no significant interaction 
of construals of self and role condition on ascribed blame (Beta = -.56, p = .20).  The 
failure to support Hypotheses 7 and 8 precludes the possibility of confirming the 
mediation posited in Hypothesis 9. 
Revenge Intentions Hypotheses.  As can be seen in Table 7, there was a significant 
main effect of anger on revenge intentions (Beta = .51, p <.01), but no significant 
interaction between country and anger on revenge intentions (Beta = .31, p = 27), which 
is supportive of Hypothesis 10.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 11, Table 7 demonstrates that controlling for anger, 
there was a significant interaction of country and level of shame on revenge intentions 
(Beta = .71, p < .05).  Figure 9 illustrates the nature of this interaction.  In support of 
Hypothesis 11, it appears that Koreans are more sensitive to experienced shame when 
formulating revenge intentions than Americans.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 12, Table 7 demonstrates that there was a significant 
interaction of collective construal of self at the societal referent and shame level on 
revenge intentions (Beta = 1.04; p < .05).  Figure 10 illustrates the nature of the 
interaction.  In support of Hypothesis 12, it appears the individuals with high collective 
selves are more sensitive to experienced shame when formulating revenge intentions than 
individuals with low collective selves.  
Finally, Table 7 demonstrates that when the self-construal (societal referent) and 
shame level interaction is controlled, the country by shame level interaction becomes 
insignificant (Beta = .60, p = .14).  Furthermore, Sobel test analyses indicate a significant 
43
mediation of the societal referent collective self-construal (t = 2.19, p < .05). Thus, 
Hypothesis 13 was supported.
Notably, neither the individual referent independent self scale (Beta = -.36, p = 
.48), nor the individual referent collective self scale (Beta = -.70, p = .19) interacted with 
shame level to predict revenge intentions.  Additionally, the societal referent independent 
self scale did not interact with shame level to predict revenge intentions (Beta = -.41, p = 
.37).  
Study 2 Discussion
Blame Hypotheses.  As predicted, the results indicate that Americans are more 
sensitive to the actor’s level of control when ascribing blame to the actor.  Furthermore, 
the actor’s level of control was particularly salient for individuals with high collective 
construal of self (societal referent).  Finally, when the societal referent collective 
construal of self was controlled, the country difference in blame perceptions as a function 
of control level decreased substantially.  The finding suggests a mediating role of self-
construal in the blaming process.  
Also noteworthy are the findings related to the control manipulation check.  These 
results indicate that the level of actor’s control perceived by the participants was similar 
across countries.  Thus, given this evidence, it would be inconsistent to claim that 
Americans perceive the actor to have more control and thus blame him more than 
Koreans.  Rather, it seems that Americans are more sensitive to the actor’s control than 
Koreans when ascribing blame. 
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Contrary to predictions, however, Koreans did not appear more sensitive to the 
level of actor’s role in ascription of blame.  The failure of the role manipulation check to 
detect the saliency of the role manipulation to the participants is a possible explanation 
for the lack of confirmation of the role hypotheses.  The role was manipulated by varying 
the amount of unofficial versus official role the co-worker possessed.  It is possible that 
the unofficial role was construed just as strongly as an official role (a job position) by the 
participants.  Future role manipulations should vary the amount of responsibility along 
the same role dimension, whether it be official (e.g., manager vs. vice president) or 
unofficial (e.g., casual agreement vs. strong promise). 
In sum, Americans seem to put greater emphasis on the actor’s level of control 
than Koreans when determining blame.  As can be seen in Figure 7, this effect is 
especially potent in the no control condition (i.e., co-worker got into an accident that was 
not his fault) where Americans ascribe much less blame than Koreans.  The following 
question still remains: Why do Koreans ascribe substantial blame in the no 
control/accident condition, while Americans do not?  I believe the answer lies with the 
perceived amount of role responsibility in this condition.  Using the role manipulation 
check scales as a dependent variable, the results show that there is a significant 
interaction of country by control level on perceived actor’s role level (Beta = .58, t = 
2.56; p < .05).  As can be seen in Figure 11, while Americans perceive minimal amount 
of actor’s role in the no control/accident condition, Koreans perceive substantial level of 
actor’s role responsibility.  Furthermore, collective self-construal by control interaction 
parallels this finding (Beta = .953, t = 2.72; p < .01).  As can be seen in Figure 12, 
participants with high societal referent collective self-construals perceived high role 
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responsibility in the no control/accident condition, while participants with low societal 
referent collective self-construals perceived substantially less role responsibility in that 
condition.  Clearly, Koreans and those with dominant societal referent collective selves 
perceived high role responsibility in the no control/accident condition.  This finding is 
important since analyses also show that the perceptions of actor’s role level predict 
ascriptions of blame above and beyond the control condition (Beta = .51, p < .001).  In 
fact, when the control condition is taken into account, perceptions of actor’s role explain 
21% of additional variance in blame ascriptions.   Therefore, perceptions of high role 
level by Koreans in the no control/accident condition may explain why they continue to 
blame the actor when Americans do not.   
Revenge Intention Hypotheses. Results indicate that anger motivates revenge 
intentions in both U.S. and Korea.  However, as predicted, when anger level is controlled, 
Koreans revenge intentions are more a function of their shame emotions than they are for 
Americans.  Furthermore, the shame emotions are more predictive of revenge intentions 
for individuals with high collective self-construal (societal referent).  Moreover, when the 
societal referent collective construal of self was controlled, the country difference in 
revenge intentions as a function of experienced shame was no longer significant.  The 
latter finding suggests that societal referent collective self-construals mediate the effect of 
emotions in the claiming process. 
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Chapter 3: General Discussion
It is fair to say that the extant literature on workplace revenge has confined itself 
to the borders of the United States not only in terms of samples examined, but theoretical 
assumptions posited.  The central aim of this thesis was to demonstrate the power of 
people’s assumptions about themselves and others around them to explain when they feel 
the greatest harm, cast the most blame, and most of all, feel the utmost desire to strike 
back.  
Societal Referent Self-Construal
One of the most consistent findings across both studies is the efficacy of 
participants’ perceptions of their compatriots’ construals of self to predict relevant 
dependent variables.   It is possible that scales focused on participants’ compatriots do 
not suffer from the social desirability effects that plague scales directed at the participants 
themselves.  However, it may also be the case that the efficacy of societal referent scales 
resides in their ability to capture normative pressures in one’s environment and the 
associated ‘ought’ self that is shaped by such pressures.  
As touched on previously, Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory postulates the 
existence of ‘actual’ and ‘ought’ selves (among others).  The ‘actual’ self is comprised of 
the attributes one currently possesses and the ‘ought’ self is comprised of the attributes 
one believes they should possess.  Arguably, it is the ‘ought’ self- construals, independent 
or collective, that are more determinative of cross-cultural differences in harm, blame, 
and revenge cognitions than the ‘actual’ self-construals discussed by Markus and 
Kitayama (1991).  The efficacy of ‘ought’ versus ‘actual’ self-construals in explaining 
cross-cultural differences requires further theoretical development and empirical support.
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Limitations and Future Directions
In terms of providing firmer support for the influence of the independent variables 
tested, replication of the effects with behavioral outcomes is warranted.  Although 
cognitions, emotions, and intentions are powerful predictors of behavior in many 
domains, the link between one’s psychology and behavior has not been examined in the 
realm of revenge.  Moving beyond scenario methodology to lab-based experimentation 
and field-based quasi-experimentation may be as necessary as it is difficult to carry out 
given the topic’s nature.
On more theoretical grounds, the moderating psychological mechanisms are in 
need of more exact treatment.  Key questions remain to be answered.  Are cross-cultural 
differences in harm, blame, and revenge cognitions a consequence of differences in 
‘actual’ or ‘ought’ self-construals and why?  Furthermore, can socio-cultural pressures 
have an influence on our reactions without the mediation of our actual or ought construals 
of self, and if so, what psychological structures do mediate?  Finally, given the 
explanatory power of the societal referent collective self-construal to predict in the
context of this thesis, further theoretical and empirical work on the why behind the 
potency of this scale, and not any other, is highly warranted. 
Practical Implications
As the results suggest, duty or promise breaking can be substantially more hurtful 
to those cultures where the collective construal of self is cultivated.  This finding has very 
practical implications for intercultural interaction.  Most of all, one must be wary of 
estimating the injuriousness of a duty or a promise breach based on one’s own cultural 
view.  
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Also, results show that the level of an actor’s control may be much less important 
to the ascription of blame in cultures where the collective self is dominant.  This suggests 
that excuses emphasizing one’s lack of control in a given situation are not an effective 
way of minimizing blame.  This finding is of outmost practical importance as attributions 
of blame and responsibility are ubiquitous in intercultural dealings.  Also, attributions of 
severe blame, in spite of no or minimal control in the situation, suggests that for cultures 
where the collective self is dominant, blame ascriptions may stand on a different 
foundation.  Particularly, in these cultures, a person’s social role responsibility may be 
another critical determinant of blame ascriptions.  Thus, the most successful excuses in 
such cultures may comprise of convincing justifications emphasizing one’s lack of an a 
priori role obligation to prevent the incident.  
Finally, cross-cultural differences in the motivational meaning of the shame 
emotion appear to be highly relevant to intended actions.  As results suggest, in cultures 
where the collective self is dominant, felt shame is a call to action.  Understanding 
distinct motivational qualities of emotions in cross-cultural interaction is critical, since 
intense emotions are often proximal precursors of drastic action.  
As this research demonstrates, it is not the origin of one’s passport, but the 
cultured construal of the self that is most determinative of psychological reaction.  
However, construals vary systematically across national borders, and thus, understanding 
cross-national differences in these construals allows for a more global insight into the 
variety of cognitive and emotive revenge pathways extant, making distinct methods of 
pacification, and perhaps prevention, of the revenge impulse possible.  
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Table 1. Self-Construal (Individual Referent) CFA in US and Korea
U.S. Sample Korean Sample
Chi-Square                       56.38                                     98.66
Df                                        34                                         34
Chi-Square/Df                  1.66                                         2.9
CFI                                    .95                                          .86
RMSEA                             .06                                          .10
SRMR                   .06                   .10
Parcel Loadings
Ind1                                   .71                                          .72  
Ind2                                   .51                                          .43
Ind3                                   .55                                          .40
Ind4                                   .53                                          .74
Ind5                                   .65                                          .41
Coll1                                 .56                                          .53
Coll2                                 .46                                          .52
Coll3                                 .46                                          .65
Coll4                                 .62                                          .56
Coll5                                 .65                                          .56
Corr. b/t Scales                 .05                                          .05
50
Table 2. Self-Construal (Societal Referent) CFA in US and Korea
U.S. Sample Korean Sample
Chi-Square                       75.09                                     81.79
Df                                        34                                         34
Chi-Square/Df                  2.21                                        2.41
CFI                                     .91                                         .90
RMSEA                              .08                                         .08
SRMR                                 .07                                        .08
Parcel Loadings
Ind1                                   .36                                        .44                                       
Ind2                                   .50                                        .36
Ind3                                   .46                                        .34
Ind4                                   .39                                        .48
Ind5                                   .50                                        .34
Coll1                                 .38                                        .45
Coll2                                 .32                                        .38
Coll3                                 .33                                        .38
Coll4                                 .40                                        .37
Coll5                                 .29                                        .35
Corr. b/t Scales                 .50                                       -.16
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Study 1
Mean SD Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Country (1 = U.S.A) n/a n/a 1.0 .01 -.01 .17* -.11 .05 -.25** .64**
2. Violation Condition (1 = right) n/a n/a 1.0 .01 -.30** -.14 .11 .05 -.07
3. Severity Condition (1 = high) n/a n/a 1.0 -.14 .00 .17* .18* -.04
4. Perceived Harm 4.50 .67 1.0 -.02 .07 -.15 .08
5. Independent Construal   
          (Individual)
4.75 .64 1.0 -.01 .14 .11
6. Collective Construal  
         (Individual)
4.84 .66 1.0 .21** .20**
7. Independent Construal 
           (Society)
3.07 .50 1.0 -.02
8. Collective Construal 
           (Society)
3.46 .52 1.0
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
        ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 4. Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Study 1
Hypothesis 1
Harm
 R2 F Beta
Country  .17*
Violation -.30*
Step 1
Severity
.14 8.49
-.14
Country by Severity -.04
Violation by Severity -.27
Step 2 
Country by Violation
.03 5.3
.73*
Step 3 3-Way Interaction .00 4.51 -.07
Hypothesis 2
Harm
 R2 F Beta
Collective Self 
(Society)
.07Step 1
Violation 
.09 8.23
-.29**
Step 2 Collective Self 
(Society) by Violation 
Interaction
.03 7.16 1.17*
Hypothesis 3
Harm
 R2 F Beta
Country  .22*
Violation -.31**
Step 1
Collective Self 
(Society)
.12 7.40
-.08
Step 2 Collective Self 
(Society) by Violation 
Interaction
.03 6.94 1.2*
Step 3 Country by Violation 
Interaction
.03 5.79 .45
Note. *Beta is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
        **Beta is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Study 2
Mean SD Correlations                        
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Country (1 = U.S.A) n/a n/a 1.0 .01 .01 .31** .28** .10 .25** -.20**-.17**-.31** .66**
2. Control Condition (1 = high) n/a n/a 1.0 -.02 -.59**-.31**-.60**-.42** -.07 -.02 -.06 -.09
3. Role Condition (1 = high) n/a n/a 1.0 -.08 .10 -.08 -.07 .05 .01 .01 .14*
4. Blame 3.19 .97 1.0 .46** .76** .58** -.03 -.02 -.04 .32**
5. Anger 3.38 1.1
1
1.0 .54** .57** .02 .08 -.01 .23**
6. Shame 2.99 .85 1.0 .41** .02 .00 -.05 .32**
7. Revenge Intentions 1.94 1.0
6
1.0 .00 -.15* -.17** .22**
8. Independent Construal  
         (Individual)
4.78 .67 1.0 .12 .20** .01
9. Collective Construal  
         (Individual)
4.73 .61 1.0 .23** .01
10. Independent Construal 
           (Society)
3.04 .50 1.0 -.14*
11. Collective Construal 
           (Society)
3.42 .58 1.0
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
        ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6. Hierarchical Regression Blame Analyses for Study 2
Hypotheses 4 and 7
Blame
 R2 F Beta
Country   .31**
Role Level -.10*
Step1
Control Level
.46 65.87
-.60**
Control by Role 
Interaction
  .28
Country by Role Level 
Interaction
-.12
Step 2
Country by Control Level 
Interaction
.02 34.9
.43*
Step 3 3-Way Interaction .00 29.94 -.52
Hypothesis 5
Blame
 R2 F Beta
Collective Self (Society)  .27**Step1
Control .42 86.14 -.57**
Step 2 Collective Self (Society) 
by Control Interaction
.01 59.78 .66*
Hypothesis 6 
Blame
 R2 F Beta
Country .24**
Control -.58**
Step 1
Collective Self (Society)
.45 65.09
  .11
Step 2 Collective Self (Society) 
by Control Interaction
.01 51.39 .74*
Step 3 Country by Control 
Interaction
.00 41.18
   .21
Hypothesis 8
Blame
 R2 F Beta
Collective Self (Society) .34**Step 1
Role .12 15.94 -.13*
Step 2 Collective Self (Society) 
by Role Interaction
.01 11.21 -.56
Note. *Beta is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
        **Beta is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 7. Hierarchical Regression Revenge Intentions Analyses for Study 2
Hypotheses 10 and 11
Revenge Intentions
 R2 F Beta
Country  .18**
Anger .51**
Step 1
Shame
.37 46.34
.08
Country by Anger 
Interaction
    .31Step 2
Country by Shame 
Interaction 
.03 31.34
.71*
Hypothesis 12
Revenge Intentions
 R2 F Beta
Collective Self (Society)    .10Step 1
Shame .18 25.11 .38**
Step 2 Collective Self (Society) by 
Shame Interaction
.02 18.64
 1.04*
Hypothesis 13
Revenge Intentions
 R2 F Beta
Country   .22**
Anger .52**
Shame   .09
Step 1
Collective Self (Society)
.38 35.05
-.07
Step 2 Collective Self (Society) by 
Shame Interaction
.02 29.83    1.0*
Country by Anger 
Interaction
   .30Step 3
Country by Shame 
Interaction 
.02 22.62
   .60
Note. *Beta is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
        **Beta is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 1.  Dispute Transformation Model (Festinger, Abel and Sarat, 1980)
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Figure 2. General Revenge Model.
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Figure 3. Perceptions of Right Violations in US and Korea across Right and Duty 
Conditions
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Figure 4. Perceptions of Duty Violations in US and Korea across Right and Duty 
Conditions
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Figure 5. Interaction of Country by Violation Condition on Perceived Harm              
(Hypothesis 1)
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Figure 6. Interaction of Collective Self-Construal (Societal Referent) by Violation 
Condition on Perceived Harm (Hypothesis 2)
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Figure 7. Interaction of Country by Control Condition on Ascribed Blame (Hypothesis 4)
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Figure 8. Interaction of Collective Self-Construal (Societal Referent) by Control 
Condition on Ascribed Blame (Hypothesis 5)
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Figure 9. Interaction of Country by Shame Level on Revenge Intentions (Hypothesis 11)
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Figure 10. Interaction of Collective Self-Construal (Societal Referent) by Shame Level 
on Revenge Intentions (Hypothesis 12)
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Figure 11. Interaction of Country by Control Condition on Perceived Role Level
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Figure 12. Interaction of Collective Self-Construal (Societal Referent) by Control 
Condition on Perceived Role Level
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APPENDIX A.  Study 1 Scenario Manipulations
Participants were told: As you read the story below, please imagine yourself in 
the situation described.
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month your agency was 
asked to come up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile phone 
company.  You and your coworkers were given two weeks to brainstorm 
ideas for the project.  You were told that at the end of the two weeks all of 
you would meet and present your suggestions.
[Rights Violation]
After considerable effort, you came up with some unique and 
creative ideas for the advertising campaign. As the deadline approached, 
you happened to share your ideas with a co-worker, with whom you work 
regularly. However, at the end of the two weeks, during your meeting, that 
co-worker spoke before you and presented your rightful ideas as his own 
without giving you any credit. 
[Duty Violation]
A co-worker, with whom you work regularly, owed you favor and 
promised to help. While you were going to brainstorm for ideas, he 
promised to do research on your client, the mobile phone company, which 
was vital to completing your recommendations.  As the deadline 
approached, your co-worker informed you that he didn’t do the research 
he owed you, and was not going to fulfill his obligation to you. 
[High Severity]
As a result, you were unprepared for the meeting and you did not 
get the promotion you would have otherwise.
  [Low Severity]
However, due to your quick thinking, you had ideas to present and 
seemed prepared for the meeting.
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APPENDIX B.  Independent and Collective Self-Construal (Individual Referent) Items
Participants were told: This is a questionnaire that measures a variety of feelings and         
behaviors in various situations.  Listed below are a number of statements.  Read each one            
as if it referred to YOU.  Please circle the number that best matches your agreement or           
disagreement.
Independent Self.
1) I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects
2) I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am
3) I do my own thing, regardless of what others think
4) I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person
5) I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood
6) Having a lively imagination is important to me
7) I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met
8) I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards
9) Speaking up during a class (or a meeting) is not a problem for me
10) I act the same way no matter who I am with
11) I value being in good health over everything
12) I try to do what is best for me, regardless of how that might affect others
13) Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me
14) My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me
15) I act the same way at home that I do at school
Collective Self. 
1) Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument
2) I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact
3) I respect people who are modest about themselves
4) I will sacrifice my self interest for the benefit of the group I am in
5) I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making 
education/career plans
6) I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me
7) I feel good when I cooperate with others
8) If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible
9) I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than 
my own accomplishments
10) I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor (or my boss)
11) My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me
12) I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group
13) It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group
14) It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group
15) I usually go along with what others want to do, even when I would rather do 
something different
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APPENDIX C.  Independent and Collective Self-Construal (Societal Referent) Items
Participants were asked: How frequently, in your opinion, do most (Americans/Koreans)
do this?
Independent Self.
1) Enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects
2) Feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after meeting them, even when they are much older 
3) Do one’s own thing, regardless of what others think
4) Act as an independent person
5) Say “No” directly, rather than risk being misunderstood
6) Have a lively imagination 
7) Be direct and forthright when dealing with people just met
8) Be comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards
9) Speak up during a class (or a meeting) 
10) Act the same way no matter who one is with
11) Value being in good health over everything
12) Try to do what is best for yourself regardless of how that might affect others
13) Take care of one’s own needs
14) Have a personal identity, independent of others
15) Act the same way at home as one does at school
Collective Self. 
1) Even when strongly disagreeing with group members, avoid an argument
2) Have respect for the authority figures with whom one interacts
3) Respect people who are modest about themselves
4) Sacrifice own self interest for the benefit of one’s group 
5) Take into consideration parents’ advice when making education/career plans
6) Feel that a person’s fate is intertwined with the fate of those around them
7) Feel good when cooperating with others
8) Feel responsible if one’s brother or sister fails
9) Feel that one’s relationships with others are more important than one’s own 
accomplishments
10) Offer one’s seat in a bus to my professor (or one’s boss)
11) Have one’s happiness depend on the happiness of those around them
12) Stay in a group if one is needed, even when one is not happy with the group
13) Respect decisions made by the group
14) Maintain harmony within one’s group
15) Go along with what others want to do, even when one would rather do something different
71
APPENDIX D.  Study 2 Scenario Manipulations 
Participants were told: As you read the story below, please imagine yourself in 
the situation described.
You work at an advertising agency.  Last month you were asked to 
come up with a new advertising campaign for a mobile phone company.  
Your agency was very interested in attracting more business from this 
mobile phone company in the future.
[High Role]
A co-worker, with whom you work with regularly, was going to deliver 
your project by 5 p.m. that day, the deadline for the job.  You asked the co-worker 
to deliver your project over to the phone company by that deadline since he was 
in charge of office mail and delivering documents was part of his job duties.
[Low Role]
A co-worker, with whom you work with regularly, was going to deliver 
your project by 5 p.m. that day, the deadline for the job.  You asked the co-worker 
to deliver your project over to the phone company by that deadline although 
delivering documents was not part of his job duties.
[High Control]
Unfortunately, later in the day he decided that the delivery of your project 
was not a priority.  As a result, he intentionally turned in your project after the 5 
p.m. deadline. 
[Low Control]
Unfortunately, he forgot about the delivery. As a result, he unintentionally 
turned in your project after the 5 p.m. deadline. 
[No Control]
Unfortunately, on the way to delivery, he got into a car accident that was 
completely not his fault.  As a result, he turned in your project after the 5 p.m. 
deadline. 
Due to the lateness of the project the mobile phone company could not 
consider your advertising campaign and did not buy it.
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APPENDIX E. Ascriptions of Blame Scale Items
Participants were told: Please imagine the story you just read happened to you.  Tell us 
how much you agree with each statement. Please give us your honest opinion by circling 
the number that best matches your answer.
1)  I do not blame the co-worker for the way he acted (R)
2)  The co-worker is solely to blame for his actions
3)  I was victimized by the co-worker
4) The co-worker wronged me
5) I blame the co-worker
6) The co-worker is guilty
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APPENDIX F. Anger Scale Items
Participants were told: Tell us how likely you are to have the feelings described in each 
statement.  Please give us your honest opinion by circling the number that best matches 
your answer.        
1) I would be angry at the co-worker
2) The co-worker’s actions would make me very mad
3) I would feel hostility towards the co-worker
4) I would feel loathing towards the co-worker
5) I would be furious at the co-worker
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APPENDIX G. Shame Scale Items
Participants were told: Tell us how likely you are to have the feelings described in each 
statement.  Please give us your honest opinion by circling the number that best matches 
your answer.        
1) I would feel embarrassed in this situation
2) I would feel ridiculous in this situation
3) I would feel self-conscious in this situation
4) I would feel humiliated in this situation 
5) I would have feelings of blushing in this situation
6) I would feel laughable in this situation
7) I would feel disgusting to others in this situation
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APPENDIX H. Revenge Intentions Scale Items
Participants were told: Tell us how likely you are to take the actions described in each 
statement.  Please give us your honest opinion by circling the number that best matches 
your answer.
1) I would make him pay
2) I wish that something bad would happen to him
3) I would want him to get what he deserves
4) I would get even
5) I would want to see him hurt and miserable
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